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Summary
Background Isolation of cases and contact tracing is used to control outbreaks of infectious diseases, and has been 
used for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Whether this strategy will achieve control depends on characteristics 
of both the pathogen and the response. Here we use a mathematical model to assess if isolation and contact tracing 
are able to control onwards transmission from imported cases of COVID-19.
Methods We developed a stochastic transmission model, parameterised to the COVID-19 outbreak. We used the 
model to quantify the potential effectiveness of contact tracing and isolation of cases at controlling a severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)-like pathogen. We considered scenarios that varied in the number 
of initial cases, the basic reproduction number (R0), the delay from symptom onset to isolation, the probability that 
contacts were traced, the proportion of transmission that occurred before symptom onset, and the proportion of 
subclinical infections. We assumed isolation prevented all further transmission in the model. Outbreaks were deemed 
controlled if transmission ended within 12 weeks or before 5000 cases in total. We measured the success of controlling 
outbreaks using isolation and contact tracing, and quantified the weekly maximum number of cases traced to measure 
feasibility of public health effort.
Findings Simulated outbreaks starting with five initial cases, an R0 of 1·5, and 0% transmission before symptom onset 
could be controlled even with low contact tracing probability; however, the probability of controlling an outbreak 
decreased with the number of initial cases, when R0 was 2·5 or 3·5 and with more transmission before symptom 
onset. Across different initial numbers of cases, the majority of scenarios with an R0 of 1·5 were controllable with less 
than 50% of contacts successfully traced. To control the majority of outbreaks, for R0 of 2·5 more than 70% of contacts 
had to be traced, and for an R0 of 3·5 more than 90% of contacts had to be traced. The delay between symptom onset 
and isolation had the largest role in determining whether an outbreak was controllable when R0 was 1·5. For R0 values 
of 2·5 or 3·5, if there were 40 initial cases, contact tracing and isolation were only potentially feasible when less than 
1% of transmission occurred before symptom onset.
Interpretation In most scenarios, highly effective contact tracing and case isolation is enough to control a new 
outbreak of COVID-19 within 3 months. The probability of control decreases with long delays from symptom onset to 
isolation, fewer cases ascertained by contact tracing, and increasing transmission before symptoms. This model can 
be modified to reflect updated transmission characteristics and more specific definitions of outbreak control to assess 
the potential success of local response efforts.
Funding Wellcome Trust, Global Challenges Research Fund, and Health Data Research UK.
Copyright © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
4.0 license.
Introduction
As of Feb 5, 2020, more than 24 550 cases of coronavirus 
disease 2019 (COVID-19) had been confirmed, including 
more than 190 cases outside of China, and more than 
490 reported deaths globally.1 Control measures have 
been implemented within China to try to contain the 
outbreak.2 As people with the infection arrive in 
countries or areas without ongoing transmission, efforts 
are being made to halt transmission, and prevent 
potential outbreaks.3,4 Isolation of confirmed and 
suspected cases, and identification of contacts are a 
crucial part of these control efforts; however, whether 
these efforts will achieve control of transmission of 
COVID-19 is unclear.
Isolation of cases and contact tracing becomes less 
effective if infectiousness begins before the onset of 
symptoms.5,6 For example, the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) outbreak that began in southern China 
in 2003, was eventually able to be controlled through 
tracing contacts of suspected cases and isolating 
confirmed cases because the majority of transmission 
occurred after symptom onset.7 These interventions also 
play a major role in response to outbreaks where onset of 
symptoms and infectiousness are concurrent—eg, Ebola 
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virus disease,8,9 Middle East respiratory syndrome 
(MERS),10,11 and many other infections.12,13
The effectiveness of isolation and contact-tracing 
methods hinges on two key epidemiological parameters: 
the number of secondary infections generated by each 
new infection and the proportion of transmission that 
occurs before symptom onset.5 In addition, successful 
contact tracing and reducing the delay between 
symptom onset and isolation are crucial, because, 
during this time, cases remain in the community where 
they can infect others until isolation.6,14 Transmission 
before symptom onset could only be prevented by 
tracing contacts of confirmed cases and testing (and 
quarantining) those contacts. Cases that do not seek 
care, potentially because of subclinical infection, are a 
further challenge to control.
If COVID-19 can be controlled by isolation and contact 
tracing, then public health efforts should be focused on 
this strategy; however, if this is not enough to control 
outbreaks, then additional resources might be needed 
for additional interventions. Several key characteristics 
of the transmissibility and natural history of COVID-19 
are currently unknown—eg, whether transmission can 
occur before symptom onset. Therefore, we explored a 
range of epidemiological scenarios that represent 
potential transmission properties based on current 
information about COVID-19 transmission. We assessed 
the ability of isolation and contact tracing to control 
disease outbreaks in areas without widespread 
transmission using a mathematical model.6,15–17 By 
varying the efficacy of contact-tracing efforts, the size of 
the outbreak when detected, and the promptness of 
isolation after symptom onset, we show how viable it is 
for countries at risk of imported cases to use contact 
tracing and isolation as a containment strategy.
Methods
Model structure
We implemented a branching process model, in which 
the number of potential secondary cases produced by each 
individual is drawn from a negative binomial distribution 
with a mean equal to the reproduction number, and 
heterogeneity in the number of new infections produced 
by each individual.6,15,17–19 Each potential new infection was 
assigned a time of infection drawn from the serial interval 
distribution. Secondary cases were only created if the 
person with the infection had not been isolated by the 
time of infection. As an example (figure 1), a person 
infected with the virus could potentially produce three 
secondary infections (because three is drawn from the 
negative binomial distribution), but only two trans-
missions might occur before the case is isolated. Thus, in 
the model, a reduced delay from onset to isolation would 
reduce the average number of secondary cases.
We initialised the branching process with five, 20, or 
40 cases to represent a newly detected outbreak of varying 
size. Initial symptomatic cases were then isolated after 
symptom onset with a delay drawn from the onset-to-
isolation distribution (table). Isolation was assumed to be 
100% effective at preventing further transmission; 
therefore, in the model, failure to control the outbreak 
resulted from the incomplete contact tracing and the 
delays in isolating cases rather than the inability of 
isolation to prevent further transmission. Either 100% or 
90% of cases became symptomatic, and all symptomatic 
cases were eventually reported.
Research in context
Evidence before this study
Contact tracing and isolation of cases is a common intervention 
for controlling infectious disease outbreaks. It can be effective 
but might require intensive public health effort and 
cooperation to effectively reach and monitor all contacts. 
Previous work has shown that when the pathogen has 
infectiousness before symptom onset, control of outbreaks 
using contact tracing and isolation is more challenging. Further 
introduction of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) to new 
territories is likely in the coming days and weeks, and 
interventions to prevent an outbreak following these 
introductions are a key mitigating strategy. Current planning is 
focused on tracing of contacts of introduced cases, and rapid 
isolation. These methods have been used previously for other 
novel outbreaks, but it is not clear if they will be effective for 
COVID-19.
Added value of this study
We use a mathematical model to assess the feasibility of 
contact tracing and case isolation to control outbreaks of 
COVID-19. We used disease transmission characteristics specific 
to the pathogen and give the best available evidence if contact 
tracing and isolation can achieve control of outbreaks. 
We simulated new outbreaks starting from 5, 20, or 40 
introduced cases. Contact tracing and isolation might not 
contain outbreaks of COVID-19 unless very high levels of 
contact tracing are achieved. Even in this case, if there is 
subclinical transmission, or a high fraction of transmission 
before onset of symptoms, this strategy might not achieve 
control within 3 months.
Implications of all the available evidence
The effectiveness of isolation of cases and contacts to control 
outbreaks of COVID-19 depends on the precise characteristics of 
transmission, which remain unclear at the present time. Using 
the current best understanding, around 80% of symptomatic 
contacts must be traced and isolated to control over 80% of 
outbreaks in the model. Future research on the transmission 
characteristics could improve precision on control estimates.
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Each newly infected case was identified through 
contact tracing with probability ρ. Secondary cases that 
had been traced were isolated immediately on becoming 
symptomatic. Cases that were missed by contact tracing 
(probability 1–ρ) were isolated when they became 
symptomatic, with a delay drawn from the onset-to-
isolation distribution.
In addition, each case had an independent probability 
of being subclinical, and was therefore not detected 
either by self-report or contact tracing. New secondary 
cases caused by a subclinical case were missed by contact 
tracing and could only be isolated on the basis of 
symptoms. The model included isolation of symptomatic 
individuals only—ie, no quarantine, so isolation could 
not prevent transmission before symptom onset. In the 
model, subclinical cases were never isolated, whereas 
symptomatic cases might transmit before symptoms 
appear, but were eventually isolated. Quarantining 
contacts of cases (ie, individuals who are not yet 
symptomatic, and might not be infected) requires a 
considerable investment in public health resources, and 
has not been widely implemented for all contacts of 
cases.3 However, some countries have adopted a 
quarantine or self-quarantine policy for airline travellers 
who have returned from countries with confirmed 
COVID-19 transmission.23
Transmission scenarios
We ran 1000 simulations of each combination of R0, the 
proportion of transmission before symptom onset, onset-
to-isolation delay, the number of initial cases, and the 
probability that a contact was traced (table).
We explored two scenarios of delay (short and long) 
between symptom onset and isolation (figure 2). The 
short delay was estimated during the late stages of the 
2003 SARS outbreak in Singapore,18 and the long delay 
was an empirical distribution calculated from the early 
phase of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan.23 We varied 
the percentage of contacts traced from 0% to 100%, 
at 20% intervals, to quantify the effectiveness of contact 
tracing.
The incubation period for each case was drawn from a 
Weibull distribution. A corresponding serial interval for 
each case was then drawn from a skewed normal 
distribution with the mean parameter of the distribution 
Figure 1: Example of the simulated process that starts with person A being infected
After an incubation period, person A shows symptoms and is isolated at a time drawn from the delay distribution (table). A draw from the negative binomial 
distribution with mean reproduction number (R0) and distribution parameter determines how many people person A potentially infects. For each of those, a serial 
interval is drawn. Two of these exposures occur before the time person A is isolated. Each contact is traced with probability ρ, with probability 1–ρ they are missed by 
contact tracing. Person B is successfully traced, which means that they will be isolated without delay when they develop symptoms. They could, however, still infect 
others before they are isolated. Person C is missed by contact tracing. This means that they are only detected if and when symptomatic, and are isolated after a delay 
from symptom onset. Because person C was not traced, they infected two more people (E and F), in addition to person D, than if they had been isolated at symptom 
onset. A version with subclinical transmission is given in the appendix (p 12).
IsolatedInfects
person B
Infects
person C
Infects
person E
Infects
person F
Infects
person D
SymptomsInfected
Symptoms + 
isolated
Incubation Delay from onset to isolation
No infection
(isolated)
Serial intervals
Incubation
Serial intervals
No infection No infection
Incubation Delay from onset to isolation
Traced (ρ)
Not traced (1–ρ)
Serial intervals
Symptoms Isolated
A B
C
x
x
x
D
E
F
Person A
Person B
Person C
Infected
Infected
Value Reference
Sampled
Delay from onset to isolation (short) 3·43 days (2·02–5·23) Donnelly et al20
Delay from onset to isolation (long) 8·09 days (5·52–10·93) Li et al21
Incubation period 5·8 days (2·6) Backer et al22
Serial interval Incubation period (2) Assumed
Fixed
Initial cases 5, 20, and 40 Public Health England11 and 
Klinkenberg and colleagues14
Percentage of contacts traced 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100% Tested
Reproduction number (R0; low, central, 
high estimate)
1·5, 2·5, 3·5 Kucharski et al17 and Imai et al18
Overdispersion in R0 (SARS-like) 0·16 Lloyd-Smith et al19
R0 after isolation 0 Assumed
Cases isolated once identified 100% Assumed
Isolation effectiveness 100% Assumed
Subclinical infection percentage 0%, 10% Tested
Data are median (IQR) or mean (SD), n, or %. Sampled values are probabilistically sampled during the simulation, and 
fixed values remain constant during the simulation. The mean of the short and long delays are 3·83 and 9·1, 
respectively. SARS=severe acute respiratory syndrome.
Table: Parameter values for the model
See Online for appendix
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set to the incubation period for that case, an SD of 2, 
and a skew parameter chosen such that a set proportion 
of serial intervals were shorter than the incubation 
period (meaning that a set proportion of transmission 
happened before symptom onset; figure 2). This 
sampling approach ensured that the serial interval and 
incubation period for each case was correlated, and 
prevented biologically implausible scenarios where a 
case could develop symptoms soon after exposure, but 
not become infectious until very late after exposure and 
vice versa.
There are many estimates of the reproduction 
number for the early phase of the COVID-19 outbreak 
Figure 2: Probability distributions used in simulations
(A) The short and long delay distributions between the onset of symptoms and 
isolation (median marked by line). Parameter values and references are given in 
the table. (B) The incubation distribution estimate fitted to data from the 
Wuhan outbreak by Backer and colleagues.22 (C) An example of the method used 
to sample the serial interval for a case that has an incubation period of 5 days. 
Each case has an incubation period drawn from the distribution in (B), their 
serial interval is then drawn from a skewed normal distribution with the mean 
set to the incubation period of the case. In (C), the incubation period was 5 days. 
The skew parameter of the skewed normal distribution controls the proportion 
of transmission that occurs before symptom onset; the three scenarios explored 
are less than 1%, 15%, and 30% of transmission before onset.
Figure 3: Effect of isolation and contact tracing on controlling outbreaks and 
on the effective reproduction number
(A) The percentage of outbreaks that are controlled for scenarios with varying 
reproduction number (R0), at each value of contacts traced. The baseline scenario 
is R0 of 2·5, 20 initial cases, a short delay to isolation, 15% of transmission before 
symptom onset, and 0% subclinical infection. A simulated outbreak is defined as 
controlled if there are no cases between weeks 12 and 16 after the initial cases. 
Other scenarios are presented in the appendix (p 2). (B) Effective reproduction 
number in the presence of case isolation and contact tracing. Median, and 50% 
and 95% intervals are shown.
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in Wuhan, China,15,17,18,21,24–28 and therefore we used the 
values 1·5, 2·5, and 3·5, which span most of the 
range of current estimates (table). We used the 
secondary case distribution from the 2003 SARS 
outbreak,19 and tested the effect of lower heterogeneity 
in the number of secondary cases29 as a sensitivity 
analysis (appendix pp 2–5). We calculated the effective 
reproduction number (Reff) of the simulation as the 
average number of secondary cases produced by each 
infected person in the presence of isolation and 
contact tracing. We present results in relation to the 
baseline scenario of R0 of 2·5,21 20 initial cases, a short 
delay to isolation,20 15% of transmission before 
symptom onset,30 and 0% subclinical infection.31 
Values of the natural history represent the current 
best understanding of COVID-19 transmission, and 
we used 20 index cases and a short delay to isolation 
to represent a relatively large influx into a setting of 
high awareness of possible infection.23
Definition of outbreak control
Outbreak control was defined as no new infections 
between 12 and 16 weeks after the initial cases. Outbreaks 
that reached 5000 cumulative cases were assumed to be 
too large to control within 12–16 weeks, and were 
categorised as uncontrolled outbreaks. Based on this 
definition, we reported the probability that an outbreak 
of a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2-like 
pathogen would be controlled within 12 weeks for each 
scenario, assuming that the basic reproduction number 
remained constant and no other interventions were 
implemented.
The probability that an outbreak is controlled gives a 
one-dimensional understanding of the difficulty of 
achieving control, because the model placed no 
constraints on the number of cases and contacts that 
could be traced and isolated. In reality, the feasibility of 
contact tracing and isolation is likely to be determined 
both by the probability of achieving control, and the 
resources needed to trace and isolate infected cases.32 We 
therefore reported the weekly maximum number of 
cases undergoing contact tracing and isolation for each 
scenario that resulted in outbreak control. New cases 
require their contacts to be traced, and if these numbers 
are high, it can overwhelm the contact-tracing system 
and affect the quality of the contact-tracing effort.33 It is 
likely that the upper limit on contacts to trace varies from 
country to country.
All code is available as an R package.
Role of the funding source
The funders of the study had no role in study design, 
data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, writing 
of the Article, or the decision to submit for publication. 
All authors had full access to all the data in the study and 
were responsible for the decision to submit the Article 
for publication.
Results
To achieve control of 90% of outbreaks, 80% of contacts 
needed to be traced and isolated for scenarios with a 
reproduction number of 2·5 (figure 3). The probability of 
control was higher at all levels of contact tracing when 
the reproduction number was 1·5, and fell rapidly for a 
reproduction number of 3·5. At a reproduction number 
of 1·5, the effect of isolation was coupled with the chance 
of stochastic extinction resulting from overdispersion,19 
which is why some outbreaks were controlled even at 0% 
contacts traced.
Isolation and contact tracing decreased transmission, 
as shown by a decrease in the effective reproduction 
number (figure 3). When the basic reproduction number 
was 1·5, the median estimate rapidly fell below 1, which 
indicated that control was probable. For the higher 
transmission scenarios, a higher level of contact tracing 
was needed to bring the median effective reproduction 
number below 1. The effect of isolation without contact 
tracing can be seen at 0%, where the effective 
reproduction number was lower than the simulated basic 
reproduction number because of rapid isolation (and 
ceasing transmission) of cases.
The number of initial cases had a large effect on the 
probability of achieving control. With five initial cases, 
there was a greater than 50% chance of achieving control 
in 3 months, even at modest contact-tracing levels 
Figure 4: Achieving control of simulated outbreaks under different transmission scenarios
The percentage of outbreaks controlled for the baseline scenario, and varied number of initial cases (A), time from 
onset to isolation (B), percentage of transmission before symptoms (C), and proportion of subclinical 
(asymptomatic) cases (D). The baseline scenario is a basic reproduction number (R0) of 2·5, 20 initial cases, a short 
delay to isolation, 15% of transmission before symptom onset, and 0% subclinical infection. Results for R0=1·5 and 
3·5 are given in the appendix. A simulated outbreak is defined as controlled if there are no cases between 
weeks 12 and 16 after the initial cases.
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(figure 4). More than 40% of these outbreaks were 
controlled with no contact tracing because of the 
combined effects of isolation of symptomatic cases and 
stochastic extinction. The probability of control dropped 
as the number of initial cases increased—eg, for 40 initial 
cases, 80% contact tracing did not lead to 80% of 
simulations controlled within 3 months.
The delay from symptom onset to isolation had a 
major role in achieving control of outbreaks (figure 4). 
At 80% of contacts traced, the probability of achieving 
control fell from 89% to 31%, with a long delay from 
onset to isolation. If no transmission occurred before 
symptom onset, then the probability of achieving 
control was higher for all values of contacts traced 
(figure 4). The difference between 15% and 30% of 
transmission before symptoms had a marked effect on 
probability to control. We found this effect in all 
scenarios tested (appendix p 5). In scenarios in which 
only 10% of cases were asymptomatic, the probability 
that simulations were controlled by isolation and contact 
tracing for all values of contact tracing decreased 
(figure 4). For 80% of contacts traced, only 37% of 
outbreaks were controlled, compared with 89% without 
subclinical infection. These figures show the effect of 
changing one model assumption at a time; all 
combinations are given in the appendix, in comparison 
to the baseline scenario (appendix pp 2–5).
In many scenarios, between 25 and 100 symptomatic 
cases occurred in a week at the peak of the simulated 
outbreak (figure 5). All of these cases, and their contacts, 
would need to be isolated. Large numbers of new cases 
can overwhelm isolation facilities, and the more contacts 
that need to be traced, the greater the logistical task of 
following them up. In the 2014 Ebola epidemic in Liberia, 
each case reported between six and 20 contacts,8 and the 
number of contacts seen in MERS outbreaks is often 
higher than that.10 20 contacts for each of 100 cases means 
2000 contacts traced to achieve control. Uncontrolled 
outbreaks typically had higher numbers of cases 
(appendix p 13). The maximum numbers of weekly cases 
Figure 5: The maximum weekly cases requiring contact tracing and isolation in scenarios with 20 index cases that achieved control within 3 months
Scenarios vary by reproduction number and the mean delay from onset to isolation. 15% of transmission occurred before symptom onset, and 0% subclinical 
infection. The percentage of simulations that achieved control is shown in the boxplot. This illustrates the potential size of the eventually controlled simulated 
outbreaks, which would need to be managed through contact tracing and isolation. *The interval extends out of the plotting region.
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in figure 5 might appear counterintuitive, because a 
lower maximum number of weekly cases is not associated 
with higher outbreak control. This occurs because with 
better contact tracing it becomes possible to control 
outbreaks with higher numbers of weekly cases.
Discussion
We determined conditions in which case isolation, 
contact tracing, and preventing transmission by contacts 
who are infected would be sufficient to control a new 
COVID-19 outbreak in the absence of other control 
measures. We found that in some plausible scenarios, 
case isolation alone would be unlikely to control 
transmission within 3 months. Case isolation was more 
effective when there was little transmission before 
symptom onset and when the delay from symptom onset 
to isolation was short. Preventing transmission by 
tracing and isolating a larger proportion of contacts, 
thereby decreasing the effective reproduction number, 
improved the number of scenarios in which control was 
likely to be achieved. However, these outbreaks required 
a large number of cases to be contact traced and isolated 
each week, which is of concern when assessing the 
feasibility of this strategy. Subclinical infection markedly 
decreased the probability of controlling outbreaks within 
3 months.
In scenarios in which the reproduction number 
was 2·5, 15% of transmission occurred before symptom 
onset, and there was a short delay to isolation, at least 
80% of infected contacts needed to be traced and isolated 
to give a probability of control of 90% or more. This 
scenario echoes other suggestions that highly effective 
contact tracing will be necessary to control outbreaks in 
other countries.16 In scenarios in which the delay from 
onset to isolation was long, similar to the delays in the 
early phase of the outbreak in Wuhan, the same contact 
tracing success of 80% achieved a probability of con-
taining an outbreak of less than 40%. Higher pre-
symptomatic transmission decreases the probability that 
the outbreaks were controlled, under all reproduction 
numbers and isolation delay distributions tested.
Our model did not include other control measures 
that might decrease the reproduction number and 
therefore also increase the probability of achieving 
control of an outbreak. At the same time, it assumed 
that isolation of cases and contacts is completely 
effective, and that all symptomatic cases are eventually 
reported. Relaxing these assumptions would decrease 
the probability that control is achieved. We also make 
the assumption that contact is required for transmission 
between two individuals, but transmission via fomites 
might be possible. This type of transmission would 
make effective contact tracing challenging, and good 
respiratory and hand hygiene would be crucial to reduce 
this route of transmission, coupled with environmental 
decontamination in health-care settings. For this reason, 
we used contact-tracing percentage intervals of 20% to 
avoid indicating more precision in the corresponding 
probability of control than the model could support.
We simplified our model to determine the effect of 
contact tracing and isolation on the control of outbreaks 
under different scenarios of transmission; however, as 
more data becomes available, the model can be updated 
or tailored to particular public health contexts. The 
robustness of control measures is likely to be affected both 
by differences in transmission between countries, but also 
by the concurrent number of cases that require contact 
tracing in each scenario. Practically, there is likely to be an 
upper bound on the number of cases that can be traced, 
which might vary by country, and case isolation is likely to 
be imperfect.34 We reported the maximum number of 
weekly cases during controlled outbreaks, but the capacity 
of response efforts might vary. In addition to the number 
of contacts, other factors could decrease the percentage of 
contacts that can be traced, such as cooperation of the 
community with the public health response.
We explored a range of scenarios informed by the latest 
evidence on transmission of COVID-19. Similar analyses 
using branching models have already been used to 
analyse the Wuhan outbreak to find plausible ranges for 
the initial exposure event size and the basic reproduction 
number.15,18 Our analysis expands on this work by 
including infectiousness before the onset of symptoms, 
case isolation, explicit modelling of case incubation 
periods, and time to infectiousness. A key area of 
uncertainty is whether, and for how long, individuals are 
infectious before symptom onset, and whether 
subclinical infection occurs; both are likely to make the 
outbreak harder to control.22 Whether, and how much, 
transmission occurs before symptoms is difficult to 
quantify. Under-reporting of prodromal symptoms, such 
as fatigue and mild fever, is possible; thus, transmission 
might not truly be occurring before symptoms, but 
before noticeable symptoms. There is evidence of 
transmission before onset,30 and so we used 15%. 
Increased awareness of prodromal symptoms, and 
therefore short delays until isolation—as seen in the 
SARS outbreak in Beijing in 200335—would increase 
control of outbreaks in our model. If contact tracing 
included testing of non-symptomatic contacts, those 
contacts could be quarantined without symptoms, which 
would decrease transmission in the model. Costs 
associated with additional testing might not be possible 
in all contexts.
The model could be modified to include some 
transmission after isolation (such as in hospitals), which 
would decrease the probability of achieving control. In 
addition, we defined an outbreak as controlled if it 
reached extinction by 3 months, regardless of outbreak 
size or number of weekly cases. This definition might be 
narrowed where the goal is to keep the overall caseload of 
the outbreak low. This might be of concern to local 
authorities for reducing the health-care surges, and 
might limit geographical spread.
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Our study indicates that in most plausible outbreak 
scenarios, case isolation and contact tracing alone is 
insufficient to control outbreaks, and that in some 
scenarios even near perfect contact tracing will still be 
insufficient, and further interventions would be required 
to achieve control. Rapid and effective contact tracing can 
reduce the initial number of cases, which would make the 
outbreak easier to control overall. Effective contact tracing 
and isolation could contribute to reducing the overall size 
of an outbreak or bringing it under control over a longer 
time period.
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